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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LAUGHTER Boris Sidis, Ph.D., M.D. © 1913, 1919, 1923 |
CHAPTER X
THE LUDICROUS AND THE INFERIOR
The sense of the ridiculous, taking its origin in laughter at what is regarded as weakness and defects, may develop in its gradual transformation, as it is becoming more and more complex with the growth of personality and individuality. When we pierce the illusions of life which are maintained with the whole force of religious and social sanctions, we laugh and see the ridiculous in the reality of social relations. We laugh at what is regarded as all-important reality. We laugh at illusions which are taken seriously as realities. The requirements of social conventionalities impose illusions on us which we regard as realities, which are worshiped as idols and divinities. The disillusionment with social life played as with stern reality is the domain of the comic in the higher sphere of human culture. Beginning with the child that makes merry at the game of imitation and make-believe, and ending with Aristophanes, Lucian, Voltaire, and Molière, who laugh and make the observers roar at the make-believe of the play of adults in social, political, religious, and family life, we find the same state of laughter at disillusionment of what is regarded as stern reality. We laugh at the real unreality or unreal reality. To quote from Schopenhauer:
Oh, for some Asmodeus of morality, to make not only roofs and walls transparent to his favorites, but also to lift the veil of dissimulation, fraud, hypocrisy, pretence, falsehood and deception, which is spread over all things! To show how little true honesty there is in the world, and how often, even where it is least to be expected, behind all the exterior outwork of virtue, secretly and in the innermost recesses, unrighteousness sits at the helm! It is just on this account that so many men of the better kind have four-footed friends: for, to be sure, how is a man to get relief from the endless dissimulation, falsity and malice of mankind, if there were no dogs into whose honest faces he could look without distrust?
For what is our civilized world but a big masquerade? where you meet knights, priests, soldiers, men of learning, barristers, clergymen, philosophers, and I don’t know what all! But they are not what they pretend to be; they are only masks, and, as a rule, behind the masks you will find money-makers. One man, I suppose, puts on the masks of law, which he has borrowed for the purpose from a barrister, only in order to be able to give another man a sound drubbing; a second has chosen the mask of patriotism and the public welfare with similar intent; a third takes religion or purity of doctrine. For all sorts of purposes, men have often put on the mask of philosophy, and even of philanthropy, and I know not what besides. Women have a smaller choice. As a rule they avail themselves of the mask of morality, modesty, domesticity, and humility. Then there are general masks, without any particular character attaching to them, like dominoes. They may be met with anywhere; and of this sort are the strict rectitude, the courtesy, the sincere sympathy, the smiling friendship, that people profess. The whole of these masks as a rule are merely, as I have said, a disguise for some industry, commerce, or speculation.
It is necessary that a man should be apprised early in life that it is a masquerade in which he finds himself. For otherwise there are many things which he will fail to understand and put with, nay, at which he will be completely puzzled, and that man longest of all whose heart is made of better clay. Such, for instance, is the favor that villainy finds; the neglect that merit, even the rarest and the greatest, suffers at the hands of those of the same profession; the hatred of truth and great capacity; the ignorance of scholars in their own province; and the fact that true wares are almost always despised and the merely specious ones in request. Therefore let even the young be instructed betimes that in this masquerade the apples are of wax, the flowers of silk, the fish of pasteboard, and that all things—yes, all things—are toys and trifles; and that of two men whom he may see earnestly engaged in business, one is supplying spurious goods and the other paying for them in false coin.
We have seen that the comic deals with disillusionment of what is regarded as stern reality, with disenchantment of the false glories of life, with bringing down of the sham superior to the level of the inferior, with the revelation of defects where dignity and perfection were believed to exist. The school boy makes game of his master, and the subject finds amusement in the anecdotes about the king, the monarch, and the autocrat. The higher, the more dignified and commanding the personages, the greater the comic effect when ridicule is directed against them. The higher are humbled, their greatness is shown to be a snare and delusion. This brings us face to face with the most essential and characteristic of human failings which often form the theme of the ridiculous, namely, conceit, stimulation, and vanity. As Schopenhauer tersely puts it: "Nothing is of greater moment to man than the gratification of his vanity, and no wound is more painful than that which is inflicted on it."
There are people who are so intensely subjective, so morbidly introspective, that their only interest and attention are concentrated on themselves. "They always think," says Schopenhauer, "of their own case as soon as any remark is made. Their whole attention is engrossed and absorbed by the merest chance reference which appears to affect them personally, be it never so remote. The outcome is that they are totally unable of forming any true objective view of things. They cannot admit any validity in arguments which tell against their interest or their vanity. They are so touchy, so readily offended, insulted or annoyed that no matter how impersonal the matter of discussion may be you must be extremely careful of your remarks which may possibly hurt the tender feelings of those worthy and sensitive individuals. . . . Fine, subtle and witty sayings as well as true and striking observations are lost upon them. But they are most tenderly sensitive to anything that may in the slightest way disturb their petty vanity or may reflect prejudicially in the most remote and indirect way on their exceedingly precious selves. They resemble the little dog upon whose toes you are apt to tread inadvertently; you know it by the shrill bark the little cur sets up; they resemble the sick man covered with wounds and boils who must be handled with great care."
In vanity the person displays before others external advantages, such as wealth, titles, nobility, office, or some other external possessions by which he wishes to indicate his superiority over his fellows. In conceit the person claims to be of superior nature, having some artistic, intellectual, moral, and physical virtues not possessed by his fellow beings; his superiority is one of personality, of body, of mind, or of both. In his comedy, "Much Ado About Nothing," Shakespeare plays with vanity and conceit as manifested in the characters of Beatrice and Benedict.
The noble and the ignoble, the superior and the inferior, the rational and the irrational are common constituents of the ludicrous. They may be contrasted in different persons, or they may be found in the same person. The abnormal hides in the superior or the normal, the noble or rational covers or disguises the ignoble and irrational. When such a relation is discovered the effect is invariably ludicrous. The discovery of the contrast relation of superior and inferior constitutes the art of the comic and the power of ridicule.
The force of irony consists just in the fact that the inferior is described in terms of the superior. Ambiguity of words and of thought is often used to that effect. The normal, supernormal, or the superior is spoken of, while the underlying suggestion is inferiority. The effect is greater the closer the inferior is made to resemble the superior. Irony is a form of dramatic act—the inferior is made to mimic the superior. The more successfully the mimicking is carried through, the more closely the copy resembles the original, so that the two are confused and one is taken for the other, the greater the success of the irony as a form of ridicule.
Irony reaches its climax of success when the original itself takes the mimicked copy of the superior with all the indirect suggestions of inferiority as a flattering picture of itself, or rather of what it intends to appear and is not.
The meaning of irony is dissemblance, and dissembling is the force of irony. We disapprove and contemn under the form of regard, respect and praise. Irony kills with faint praise. Irony is essentially dissemblance. We convey by it the very reverse of what we say. We say great when we mean small; good when we mean evil; success when we mean failure; wise when we mean silly and stupid. We feign to think as the original thinks of himself. The more closely the ideal conception of the original is imitated, so that the original takes it as a true imitation of his ideal self, the more effective is the force of the irony. The bystanders or the audience are supposed to know all the while in what direction the shafts of ridicule are thrown. The more unconscious the butt of irony is, the more successful is the irony and the greater is the force of ridicule.
And now, when we come to think about it, may we not regard irony and the comic as forms of reaction to the dissemblance, subconscious or conscious, of the original—a dissemblance, whether hypocritical or naïve, in which the original presents himself as a true and actual incarnation of the ideal? Irony reacts to semblance by a conscious dissemblance in which the original is exposed in its true nature to the public gaze. Irony counteracts semblance by dissemblance.
There is nothing so effective against vanity, the quintessence of all human infirmities and faults, as irony. It gives the hypocrite and the vain the praise and the glory which they crave and adds the string of showing their utter worthlessness:
The qualities three that in a bee we meet— |
In all comic the climax must be present. The climax is that which clinches the train of thought and at the same time gives the final sting. In irony, however, the poison of the sting runs like an undercurrent through the body of thought; it may come out suddenly with a lash and sting and once more plunge and disappear below the surface. This sudden coming to the surface in the form of a climax, leaving its sting and disappearing below the surface, out of sight, is characteristic of irony.
Excellent examples may be found in the delicate Socratic irony. To quote from Plato’s "Dialogues":
I should like to know what you think about another definition of temperance, which I just now remember to have heard from someone, who said that "temperance is doing our own business." Was he right who affirmed that? You young monster! I said; this is what Critias, or some philosopher, has told you. Someone else, then, said Critias; for certainly I have not. But what matter, said Charmides, from whom I heard this? No matter at all, I replied; for the point is not who said the words, but whether they are true or not . . . Then, as I was just saying, he who declared that temperance is a man doing his own business had another and a hidden meaning; for I do not think that he could have been such a fool as to mean this. Was he a fool who told you, Charmides? Nay, he replied, I certainly thought him a very wise man. Then I am quite certain that he put forth his definition as a riddle, thinking that no one would know the meaning of the words "doing his own business." I dare say, he replied. And what is the meaning of a man doing his own business? Can you tell me? Indeed, I cannot; and I should not wonder if the man himself who used this phrase did not understand what he was saying. Whereupon he laughed slyly and looked at Critias. Critias had long been showing uneasiness, for he felt that he had a reputation to maintain with Charmides and the rest of the company. He had, however, hitherto managed to retrain himself; but now he could no longer forbear, and I am convinced of the truth of the suspicion which I entertained at the time, that Charmides had heard this answer about temperance from Critias. And Charmides, who did not want to answer himself, but to make Critias answer, tried to stir him up. He went on pointing out that he had neen refuted, at which Critias grew angry, and appeared, as I thought, inclined to quarrel with him; just as a poet might quarrel with an actor who spoiled his poems in repeating them. . . . |
In another of his "Dialogues" Plato ridicules the Sophists:
And you and your brother, Dionysodorus, I said of all men who are now living are most likely to stimulate him to philosophy and to the study of virtue. Yes, Socrates, I rather think that we are. Then I wish that you would be good enough to defer the other part of the exhibition, and only try to persuade the youth whom you see here that he ought to be a philosopher and study virtue. Exhibit that, and you will confer a great favor on me and on every one present; for the fact is I and all of us are extremely anxious that he should become truly good. His name is Clenias, and he is the son of Axiochus, and grandson of the old Alcibiades, cousin of the Alcibiades that now is. He is quite young, and we are naturally afraid that someone may get the start of us, and turn his mind in a wrong direction, and he may be ruined. Your visit, therefore, is most happily timed; and I hope that you will make a trial of the young man, and converse with him in our presence, if you have no objections. These were pretty nearly the expressions which I used; and Euthydemus, in a manly and at the same time encouraging tone, replied: There can be no objection, Socrates, if the young man is only willing to answer questions. He is quite accustomed to do so, I replied; for his friends often come and ask him questions and argue with him; and therefore he is quite at home in answering. What followed, Crito, how can I rightly narrate? For not slight is the task of rehearsing infinite wisdom, and therefore, like the poets, I ought to commence my relation with an invocation to the Memory and the Muses. Now Euthymedes, if I remember rightly, began nearly as follows: O Clenias, are those who learn the wise or the ignorant? The youth, overpowered by the question, blushed, and in his perplexity looked at me for help; and I, knowing that he was disconcerted, said: Take courage, Clenias, and answer like a man whichever you think; for my belief is that you will derive the greatest benefit from their questions. Whichever he answers, said Dionysodurs, learning forward so as to catch my ear, his face beaming with laughter, I prophesy that he will be refuted, Socrates. . . . At these words the followers of Euthydemus, of whom I spoke, like a chorus at the bidding of their director, laughed and cheered. Then before the youth had time to recover his breath, Dionysodorus cleverly took him in hand, and said: Yes, Clenias; and when the grammar-master dictated anything to you, were they the wise boys or the unlearned who learned the dictation? The wise, replied Clenias. Then after all the wise are the learners and not the unlearned; and your last answer to Euthydemus was wrong. Then once more the admirers of the two heroes, in an ecstasy at their wisdom, gave vent to another peal of laughter, while the rest of us were silent and amazed. Euthydemus, observing this, determined to persevere with the youth; and in order to heighten the effect went on asking another similar question, which might be compared to the double turn of an expert dancer. Do those, said he, who learn learn what they know, or what they do not know? . . . The word was hardly out of his mouth when Dionysodurs took up the argument, like a ball which he caught, and had another throw at the youth. Clenias, he said, Euthydemus is deceiving you. For tell me now, is not learning acquiring knowledge of that which one learns? Euthydemus was proceeding to give the youth a third; but I knew that he was in dee water, and therefore, as I wanted to give him a respite lest he should be disheartened, I said to him consolingly: You must not be surprised, Clenias, at the singularity of their mode of speech: this I say because you may not understand what the two strangers are doing with you; they are only initiating you after the manner of the Corybantes in the mysteries; and this answers to the enthronement, which, if you have ever been initiated, is, as you will know, accompanied by dancing and sport; and now they are just dancing and prancing about you, and will next proceed to initiate you; imagine then that you have gone through the first part of the sophistical ritual, which, as Prodicus says, begins with initiation into the correct use of terms. And now, Euthydemus and Dionysodurs, I think that we have had enough of this. Will you let me see you explaining to the young man how he is to apply himself to the study of virtue and wisdom? And I will first show you what I conceive to be the nature of the task, and what sort of a discourse I desire to hear; and if I do this in a very inartistic and ridiculous manner, do not laugh at me, for I only venture to improvise before you, because I am eager to hear your wisdom: and I must therefore ask you and your disciples to refrain from laughing. |
This is in the vein of the subtle Socratic irony.
A few specimens of biting irony passing into sarcasm in which the lash of ridicule is more evident may be taken from the writings of Pascal:
The mind of
the greatest man in the world is not so independent of circumstances as to
prevent his being disturbed by the most insignificant noise. The report of a
cannon is not requisite to break the chain of his thoughts; the creaking of a
weather-cock or of a pulley will suffice. Why should you be surprised that he
cannot reason well just now? How, let me ask, is he to put his thoughts
together, as long as that fly is buzzing about his ears? If you wish him to find
out the truth, pray dive away the insect that holds his reason in check, and
disturbs that powerful understanding which governs cities and kingdoms.
Why do you murder me? A strange question! Do you not live on the other side of the water? If you lived on this side, my good Sir, I should indeed be an assassin for killing you; but you live on the side: I am acting, therefore, I am like a man of honor, and everything is as it should be. Cromwell as on the point of overturning all Christendom; the royal family would have been ruined, and his own permanently established, if a small piece of gravel had not lodged in his ureter. Rome herself was ready to tremble before him, but this small grain, of no consequence elsewhere, stopping in this particular part, he dies, his family are reduced, and the king is restored. |
Pascal ridicules the importance of human affairs and the greatness of historical events:
Whoever would fully measure the vanity of human life must consider the causes and the effects of the passion of love. If the nose of Cleopatra had been shorter the whole face of the earth would have been different. |
There is not only a light on the royal personages playing such important rôles in historical life of mankind, but also on the assumed importance of the historical events themselves. The ridicule is brought about by the play on those of Cleopatra and the face of the earth.
We may quote from Schopenhauer a few caustic remarks in which irony throws off its disguise and the chastisement of ridicule appears in full force, passing into strong, frank, blunt satire.
Should your opponent expressly challenge you to produce any objection to some definite point in his argument, and you have nothing much to say, you must try to give the matter a general turn, and then talk against that. If you are called upon to say why a particular physical hypothesis cannot be accepted, you may speak of the infallibility of human knowledge, and give various illustrations of it. If you know that you to reply to the arguments which your opponent advances, you may, by a fine stroke of irony, declare yourself to be an incompetent judge: "What you now say passes my poor powers of comprehension; it may be all very true, but I can’t understand it, and I refrain from any expression of opinion on it." In this way you insinuate to the bystanders, with whom you are in good repute, that what your opponent says is nonsense. |
Goethe says somewhere that man is not without a vein of veneration. To satisfy this impulse to venerate, even in those who have no sense for what is really worthy, substitutes are provided in the shape of princes and princely families, nobles, titles, orders, and money-bags.
As a specimen of irony on American bigotry and religious revivalism we may take the following sermon:
I may say to you, my brethring, that I am not an edicated man an’ I am not one of them as believes that edication is necessary for a gospel minister, for I believe the Lord edicates his preachers jest as he wants ’em to be edicated: an’ although I say it that oughtn’t to say it, yet in the state of Indianny, whar I live, thar’s no man as gits bigger congregregations nor what I gits. Thar may be some here to-day, my brethring, as don’t know what persuasion I am uv. Well I must say to you, my brethring, that I’m a Hard Shell Baptist. Thar’s some folks as don’t like the Hard Shell Baptist, but I’d rather have a hard shell as no shell at all. You see me here to-day, my brethering, dressed up in fine clothes; you mout think I was proud, my brethering, and although I’ve been a preacher of the gospel for twenty years an’ although I’m capting of the flatboat that lies at your landing I’m not proud, my brethring. I am not gwine to tell edzactly whar my tex may be found; suffice to say, it’s in the leds of the Bible, and you’ll find it somewhar in between the first chapter of the book of Generations and the last chapter of the book of Revolutions, and ef you’ll go and search the Scriptures, you’ll not only find my tex thar, but a great many other texes as will do you good to read, and my tex, when you shill find it, you shill find it to read thus: "And he played on a har uv a thousand strings—sperits uv jest men made perfeck." My tex, my brethring, leads me to speak of sperits. Now, thar’s a great many kinds of sperits in the world—in the fuss place, thar’s the sperits as some folks call ghosts, and thar’s the sperits uv turpentine, and thar’s the sperits as some folks call liquor, an’ I’ve got as good an artikel of them kind of sperits on my flatboat as ever was fotch down the Mississippi River; but thar’s a great many other kinds of sperits, for the tex says, "He played on a harp uv a t-h-o-u-s-and strings, sperits uv jest men made perfeck." But I’ll tell you the kind uv sperits as is ment in the tex, is fire. That’s the kind uv sperits as is ment in the tex, my brethring. Now thar’s a great many kinds of fire in the world. In the fuss place thar’s the common kind of fire you light your cigar or pipe with, and then thar’s foxfire and campfire, fire before you’re ready, and fire and fall back, and many other kinds uv fire, for the tex says, "He played on the harp of a thousand strings, sperits uv jest men made perfeck." But I’ll tell you the kind of fire as is ment in the tex, my brethring—it’s Hell Fire! an’ that’s the kind uv fire as a great many uv you’ll come to, ef you don’t do better nor what you have been doin’—for "He played on a harp uv a thousand strings, sperits uv jest men made perfeck." Now, the different sorts of fire in the world may be likened unto the different persuasions of the Christians in the world. In the first place we have the Piscapalions, an’ they are a high sailin’ and high-falutin’ set, and they may be likened unto a turkey buzzard, that flies up into the air, and he goes up, and up, and up, till he looks no bigger than your finger nail, and the fust thing you know, he cums down, and is a fillin’ himself on the carkiss of a dead hoss by the side of the road and "He played on a harp uv a thousand strings, sperits uv jest men made perfeck." And then thar’s the Methodis, and they may be likened unto the squirril runnin’ up into a tree, for the Methodis believes in gwine on from one degree to another, and finally on to perfection, and the squirril goes up and up, and up, and up, and he jumps from limb to limb, and branch to branch, and the fust thing you know he falls, and down he cums, kerflumix, and that’s like the Methodis, for they is allers fallen from grace, ah! and "He played on a harp uv a thousand strings, sperits uv jest men made perfeck." And then, my brethring, thar’s the Baptist, ah! and they have been likened unto a possum on a ‘simmon tree, and thenders may roll and the earth may quake, but that possum clings thar still, ah! and you may shake one foot loose, and the other’s thar, and you may shake all feet loose, and he laps his tail around the limb, and clings and he clings furever, for "He played on a harp uv a thousand strings, sperits uv jest men made perfeck." |
This close imitation of the conceit, vanity, ignorance, and stupidity of itinerant preachers is an excellent irony on the type of sermons delivered at American religious camps and revival meetings.
Another example of irony keyed to a higher pitch may be taken from Swift’s immortal "Gulliver’s Travels:"
The emperors of Blefuscu did frequently expostulate by their ambassadors, accusing us of making a schism in religion, by offending against a fundamental doctrine of our great prophet Lustrog in the fifty-fourth chapter of the Blundecral (which is their Al-Koran). This, however, is thought to be a mere strain upon the text; for the words are these: that all true believers shall break their eggs at the convenient end. |
This bit of irony on the stupid trivialities of religious dogmas is a stroke of genius.